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A PEEK UNDER THE SHELL: INVESTMENT BANK'S
EQUITY POSITION IN TENDER OFFEROR SHOULD
TRIGGER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
WILLIAMS ACT
In 1968 Congress enacted the Williams Act' to amend the Securities
and Excharige Act of 19342 to regulate tender offers.' A tender offer is a
public bid that an entity (bidder) makes to acquire a company's registered
equity securities from the company's existing shareholders. 4 In enacting the

Williams Act, Congress intended to protect shareholders from tender offers

1. Securities-Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclosure (Williams) Act, Pub. L. No. 90439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
2. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, (1968) (stating that purpose of
Williams Act is to require disclosure of pertinent information to shareholders in tender offers
or in corporate stock-repurchase plan) reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnmN. NEWS
2811. Until Congress enacted the Williams Act, federal securities laws only required disclosure
when opposing parties solicited shareholders' rights to vote on issues at shareholders meeting
(proxy contests). Id. at 2813; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (regulating
solicitation of proxies). The Securities and Exchange Act (Act) of 1934 requires that the party
opposing management in a proxy contest inform the shareholders of the identity of the
participants in the proxy contest and the amount of stock that the participants hold in the
company. Id. The Act also provides that the party opposing management in a proxy contest
must file information with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. In enacting
the Williams Act, Congress sought to apply to tender offers the same regulatory scheme of
disclosure that Congress had applied to proxy contests. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra, at 2813.
By requiring disclosure from bidders to shareholders of the target company in a tender offer,
Congress intended to prevent a bidder from exerting pressure on shareholders to tender stock
without adequate information concerning the bidder's identity and plans for the target company.
Id. at 2812.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2811 (describing tender offers). Although
the legislative history of the Williams Act describes a tender offer, the text of the Williams
Act does not define the term "tender offer". See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(e) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (mentioning tender offer but not defining term); see also Wellman v. Dickinson,
475 F. Supp. 783, 823-824 (S.D.N.Y.) (reasoning that circumstances and terms of party's plan
and actions to acquire stock determines whether party made tender offer) aff'd on other
grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); E. ARAow & H.
EnvoR.N, TENDER OQwERs FOR CORPORATm CONTROL 69-70 (1973) (defining term" "tender offer"
as public offer or public solicitation to purchase during fixed time period all or portion of
class of securities at specified price). See generally, Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973)
(analyzing term "tender offer"). A party making the tender offer (bidder) usually sets the
offer price above the current market price. Id. The bidder also may place conditions on the
tender offer. Id. If the tendering shareholders and other parties, such as financiers, meet the
conditions of the tender offer, the tender offer obligates the bidder to purchase the tendered
shares according to the terms of the bidder's tender offer. Id.
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that disclose only the price and expiration date of a tender offer.5 Specifically, Congress designed the Williams Act to provide the shareholders with
the relevant facts of a tender offer to enable the shareholders to make an
informed decision on whether to sell or to retain the shares of the publiclyheld company that the bidder seeks to acquire (target company). 6 Accordingly, the Williams Act requires a bidder to disclose to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and to shareholders of the target company
information that is material to the shareholders' evaluation of the bidder's
offer, including the bidder's identity and the terms of the offer. 7
Since Congress enacted the Williams Act, persons that seek to control
publicly held companies or to own the companies' equity securities increasingly have used tender offers to gain control or ownership of publicly held
companies. 8 Because of the high rate of return that capital providers can
realize in funding tender offers and because of bidders' record of repayment,
investment banks often can provide bidders with large amounts of capital

5. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2811 (stating that Williams Act attempts
to insure that shareholders in tender offer will receive adequate information regarding bidder
and bidder's tender offer before shareholder responds to bidder's tender offer); see also Edgar
v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1981) (determining that, in requiring bidders to make disclosures
to SEC and to shareholders of target companies, Congress intended to protect shareholders in
tender offers). But see Bowers, Cash Tender Offers and Mandated Disclosure, 20 AM. Bus.
L. J. 59, 61 (1982) (criticizing Congress' disclosure policy underlying Williams Act by questioning whether shareholders in tender offers actually use information other than price of bid
and expiration date in reaching investment decision).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2813 (stating that purpose of Williams
Act is to allow shareholders fair opportunity to make informed decision on whether shareholders
should accept or reject bidder's tender offer). In requiring bidders to make disclosures to
shareholders of the target companies, Congress reasoned that information concerning the
bidder and the bidder's tender offer would allow shareholders to make comparisons on the
future of the company if incumbent management continues or if the bidder succeeds in gaining
control of the company. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 &
Supp. 1986) (listing specific disclosure requirements). Section 78m(d) of the Williams Act
prescribes the information that a bidder must disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to sharheolders of the target company. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). First, § 78m(d) provides that a person that obtains more than 5% of target
company's registered stock (disclosing party) must disclose the person's identity, background,
financing, and plans for the target company. Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(A-C). Additionally, § 78m(d)
provides that the disclosing party must disclose the amount of the target company's stock that
the disclosing party owns and information regarding any contracts with another person that
concerns the target company's stock. Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(D-E). Finally, the Williams Act
empowers the SEC to require additional specific disclosures from the bidder that would aid
the shareholders facing a tender offer. Id. at § 78n(d)(1).
8. See Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L.
Rv. 991, 991-992 (1973) (discussing increase in number of tender offers after enactment of
Williams Act). During 1988 the number of tender offers and takeovers in the United States
reached 3,310 transactions and totalled more than $311 billion. See Washington Post, Jan.
31, 1989, at E4, col.5. The level of takeover activity for 1988 increased 41.6% over the 1987
level of takeover activity. Id.; see also Brancato, Takeover Bids and Highly Confident Letters,
Cong. Res. Serv., 1, 2 (August 28, 1987) (citing increase in number of tender offers due to
investment banks' expanding economic power).
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to fund tender offers.9 In arranging a large proportion of the financing for
bidders, investment banks have created new forms of financing to fund
tender offers, including high yield bonds (junk bonds) and temporary equity
investments (bridge loans).' 0 Moreover, some investment banks have established networks of investors that are ready to purchase the debt or equity
that finances tender offers." Because of the investment banks' central
position in tender offers, the investment banks in many transactions exceed
their traditional roles of financial advisors and intermediaries to become
either direct investors or option holders in the equity of the bidder. 2 In
transactions in which an investment bank becomes a direct investor or
option holder, a question arises over whether the Williams Act and SEC
regulations require the investment bank to make any disclosures to the SEC
3
and shareholders of the target company.
Courts have adopted conflicting approaches to determine whether an
investment bank that participates in a tender offer must make disclosures
to the SEC and to shareholders of the target company. 4 One approach
interprets the Williams Act to require an investment bank to make disclosures if the investment bank has a minority equity stake in the bidder and
if the investment bank plays an important role in forming and capitalizing
the bidder (principal participant test)." A second approach interprets the
Williams Act as requiring an investment bank to make disclosures if the
investment bank is, directly or indirectly, a potential beneficial owner of
more than five percent of the target company's common stock (beneficial

9. See Brancato, supra note 8, at 7, 8 (stating that as of May 1987 the investment
bank, Drexel Burhnam Lambert, Inc., had issued commitments totalling $50 billion to arrange
financing for tender offers). In addition to investment banks arranging financing for tender
offers, commercial banks provide over half the funds necessary to finance takeovers. Id. at 8.
10. See Brancato, supra note 8, at I (stating that investment banking firms, in becoming
dominant force in tender offers, have gained significant economic power). To help a bidder
initiate a tender offer, an investment bank may issue to the bidder a letter that states that the
investment bank is confident that the investment bank can arrange financing to fund the
bidder's tender offer (highly confident letter). Id. at 2. After issuing a highly confident letter,
an investment bank often finances a tender offer by selling high yield debt obligations of the
bidder (junk bonds) to investors or by making a temporary cash infusion in the bidder (bridge
loan) until the investment bank can sell the bidder's stock or bonds to investors. Id.
11. See id. at 16 (citing evidence that investment bankers draw on pool of investors that
previously have provided financing for tender offers).
12. See id. at 1 (stating that investment bankers have abandoned traditional advisory
role as principal means of profit in favor of selling new financial products and trading on
own accounts).
13. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir.
1988) (considering whether investment bank particpating in tender offer is subject to disclosure
requirements of Williams Act); Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp 1371,
1387-1388, (V.D. Pa. 1988) (same).
14. See infra notes 51-102 and accompanying text (discussing courts' conflicting approaches to determine whether investment bank must make disclosures).
15. See Koppers v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(presenting principal participant test); infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (discussing
Koppers court's principal participant test).
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ownership test).' 6 Instead of interpreting the Williams Act, a third approach
interprets SEC regulations as requiring an investment bank to disclose
information only if the investment bank controls the entity that actually
makes the tender offer (control test).17 To provide predictability and uniformity in the rules and regulations that govern tender offers to enable the
public securities markets to operate efficiently, the SEC should revise its
regulations to conform with both the text and the legislative history of the
Williams Act.' Specifically, to conform with the text and legislative history
of the Williams Act, the SEC should promulgate rules and regulations that
codify the beneficial ownership test.' 9

I.

The Williams Act's Disclosure Provisions

The Williams Act contains several provisions that govern a bidder's
obligation to disclose information to the SEC and shareholders of a target
company. 20 Section 78n(d)(1) of the Williams Act provides that, if a person
participating in a tender offer would be a beneficial owner of more than
five percent of the target company's stock upon consummation of the tender

16. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 68 (3d Cir.
1988) (Weis, J, dissenting) (presenting beneficial ownership test); infra notes 91-102 and
accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's beneficial ownership test).
17. See Interco, 860 F.2d at 64-65 (presenting control test); infra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text (discussing Interco majority's control test).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (authorizing SEC to promulgate rules
and regulations that require specific information from bidders to protect shareholders of target
company and public); see also Interco, 860 F.2d 60, 64 (3rd Cir. 1988) (stating that predictibility
in federal securities law is crucial to securities market). But see 54 Fed. Reg. 10,360 (1989)(to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, 240.13e-100, 240.14d-100) (proposed March 6, 1989)
(proposing to amend rules that govern disclosure of equity participants in tender offers). In
announcing a proposal to amend the SEC's tender offer regulations, the SEC noted that
current tender offer regulations do not provide to target companies' shareholders adequate
information concerning the identity and background of significant participants in the tender
offer. Id. at 10,361. Under the proposed amendments to the SEC's tender offer regulations,
a person that contributes more than 10% of the equity capital of bidder or that has a right
to receive more than 10% of the profits or assets upon liquidation of bidder must make
disclosures to the SEC and to the target company's shareholders. Id. The proposed amendments
to the SEC's tender offer regulation, therefore, seemingly adopt and quantify the Koppers
court's principal participation test. See id. (proposing to require significant equity participant
in bidder to make disclosures); infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers
court's principal participant test); infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text (criticizing
principal participant test).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (requiring person that would own
more than 5% of target company's registered stock upon consummation of tender offer to
make disclosures to shareholders of target company and SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100
(requiring bidder and party that controls bidder to file disclosure statement); see also infra
notes 118-133 and accompanying text (analyzing text and legislative history of Williams Act);
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to amend SEC's tender offer
regulations).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), 78m(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (governing disclosure
in tender offers); infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing Williams Act's disclosure
provisions).
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offer, the person must make disclosures to the SEC and to shareholders of
the target company. 21 In addition, Section 78n(d)(2) of the Williams Act

provides that the term "person" includes two or more persons acting as a
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring securities

of the target company?22 Finally, Section 78n(d)(1) of the Williams Act
delegates to the SEC the authority to require a bidder to disclose additional
information that protects shareholders of the target company and the public

interest.?
II.

SEC Tender Offer Regulations

Pursuant to Section 78n(d)(1) of the Williams Act, the SEC has promulgated regulations that govern tender offers. 24 In promulgating tender offer
regulations, the SEC has defined the term "bidder"

as any person who

makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender offer is made. 25 Moreover,
the SEC tender offer regulations provide that a "bidder" must file with
the SEC a tender offer statement that discloses the identity of the bidder,

the bidder's source of funding, and the amount of the target company's
stock that the bidder owns.? The SEC tender offer regulations also require
a bidder to disclose current financial information if the bidder is not a
natural person and if the bidder's financial condition is material to the
shareholders' evaluation of the bidder's tender offer.27 If the bidder is a
corporation or partnership, however, the SEC tender offer regulations

21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In the SEC tender offer regulations,
the SEC has defined the term "beneficial owner" as a person that, directly or indirectly,
acquires shares of registered stock through a purchase, contract or other arrangement. 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. Moreover, the SEC tender regulations provide that a person is a beneficial
owner of stock if the person has the right to acquire ownership of shares of stock within 60
days after expiration of the tender offer. Id. at § 240.13d-2(d)(i).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In authorizing the SEC to protect
shareholders of a target company and the public interest, the Williams Act empowers the SEC
to promulgate rules and regulations that prevent the person making the tender offer from
defrauding, deceiving, or manipulating the shareholders of the target company. Id. at § 78n(e);
see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1,2 (1988) (regulating tender offers to prevent fraud, deception or
manipulation).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-e (1988) (regulating tender offers).
25. Id. at § 240.14d-l(b)(1).
26. See id. at § 240.14d-3(a)(1) (requiring bidder to file Schedule 14D-1 with SEC). In
addition to requiring a bidder to file a disclosure statement with the SEC, the SEC tender
offer regulations require a bidder to deliver a copy of the tender offer statement to the target
company and to any other bidder. Id. at § 240.14d-3(a)(2)(i),(ii).
27. Id. at § 240.14d-100 (Item 9 of Special Instruction for Complying with Schedule
14D-1). In explaining when a bidder must disclose financial information, the SEC tender offer
regulations state that the fact and circumstances concerning a tender offer may influence
whether financial information of the bidder or person that controls the bidder is material to
the shareholders of the target company. Id. If a bidder must disclose financial information to
the SEC and shareholders of the target company, the SEC tender offer regulations require the
bidder to disclose a current income statement, current balance sheet, and net income per
common share of bidder's stock. Id. at § 240.14d-6(e)(1)(viii).
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require disclosures from the person that controls the bidding entity.? The
SEC tender offer regulations also require a person controlling the bidding
entity to file financial information if the controlling person formed the
bidder for the sole purpose to make the tender offer and if the financial
information of the controlling person is material to the shareholders' evaluation of the bidding entity's tender offer. 29
III.

JudicialApproaches in Determining Whether an Investment Bank
that Participatesin a Tender Offer Must Make Disclosures

Since Congress enacted the Williams Act and the SEC has promulgated
tender offer regulations, target companies have attempted to defeat bidders'
tender offers by bringing actions in court to enjoin bidders' tender offers. 0
In attempting to enjoin the bidders' tender offers, the target companies
usually claim that either the bidder or an entity connected to the tender
offer violated the Williams Act by failing to make appropriate disclosures
under the Williams Act or the SEC tender offer regulations.3' In particular,
two target companies have brought separate federal suits alleging that tender
offers for the companies' stock violated the Williams Act because investment
banks that owned a portion of the bidders failed to make disclosures under
the Williams Act and the SEC tender offer regulations. 3 2 In analyzing
whether the investment banks were subject to the disclosure requirements
of the Williams Act, the two federal courts interpreted the Williams Act

28. Id. at § 240.14d-100 (Item 9 of Special Instructions for Complying with Schedule
14D-l).
29. Id.; see supra note 28 (stating that, under SEC tender offer regulations, facts and
circumstances may influence determination of materiality of financial information).
30. See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 62-63 (3d Cir.
1988) (considering whether to enjoin bidder's tender offer after target company alleged that,
by failing to make disclosures to SEC and target company's shareholders, investment bank
that had option to purchase up to 36% of bidder's common stock violated Williams Act); IU
Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1988) (considering whether
to enjoin bidder's tender offer after target company alleged that, by not disclosing either
actual or expected sources and terms of bidder's financing for tender offer, bidder violated
Williams Act) aff'd en bane, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988); Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens,
831 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering whether to enjoin bidder's tender offer after
target company alleged that, by failing to disclose actual sources and terms of bidder's
financing for tender offer, bidder violated Williams Act); Koppers v. American Express Co.,
689 F. Supp. 1371, 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (considering whether to enjoin bidder's tender offer
after target company alleged that, by failing to make disclosures to SEC and to target
company's shareholders, investment bank that owned 46.1% of bidder's common equity
violated Williams Act). See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1018 (noting that target companies
routinely bring action under Williams Act to delay or defeat tender offers).
31. See supra note 30 (citing cases in which target company alleged that bidder violated
Williams Act by failing to make proper disclosures to SEC or target campany's shareholders).
32. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 63-65 (3d
Cir. 1988) (analyzing whether investment bank that has equity interest in entity that makes
tender offer must make disclosures to SEC and target company's sharholders); Koppers Co.
v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1387-1393 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same).
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and the SEC tender offer regulations. 33 In City Capital Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc. 34 a federal court of appeals, with one judge
dissenting, affirmed a district court's ruling that an investment bank that

held an option to purchase common equity in the bidder was not a "bidder"
under the SEC regulations. 35 In contrast, in Koppers Co., Inc. v. American"
Express Co.36 a federal district court determined that the investment bank's
direct equity investment in a cQmpany that partners formed to make the

tender offer (shell company) and commitment to provide additional capital
to the offeror was sufficient to deem the investment bank a bidder under
37
the Williams Act and SEC regulations.

In Koppers the United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania considered whether an investment bank that owned a fortysix percent equity interest in an entity that issued a tender offer was subject

to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. 38 The investment bank
in Koppers, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (Shearson Lehman) invested
over $23 million in a partnership, BNS Partners, to acquire shares of stock
in Koppers Co., a publicly held company.39 Shearson Lehman's investment
4
represented a forty-six and one tenth percent interest in BNS Partners. 0
The other two partners of BNS Partners, Bright Aggregates, Inc. and
Speedward Ltd., owned a forty-nine percent interest and a four and nine

tenths percent interest in BNS Partners respectively. 4' As partners in BNS

33. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers court's interpretation
of Williams Act and SEC tender offer regulations); infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text
(discussing Interco majority's interpretation of Williams Act and SEC tender offer regulations);
infra notes 91-94, 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's interpretation of Williams Act and SEC tender offer regulations).
34. 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
35. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 65 (3rd Cir.
1988); see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's holding in
Interco); infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (discussing dissenting opinion in Interco).
36. 689 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
37. Koppers Co., Inc. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1392 (W.D. Pa.
1988); see infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text (discussing district court's holding in
Koppers).
38. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1388-1389.
39. Id. at 1376, 1377. In Koppers Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (Shearson Lehman)
invested in BNS Partners through Shearson Lehman's wholly owned subsidiary, SL-Merger,
Inc. (SL-Merger). Id. at 1376. American Express Co. owned 60% of Shearson Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. (Shearson Holdings), which was Shearson Lehman's parent company. Id. SLMerger had no other business activities other than participating in BNS, Inc.'s tender offer.
Id.
40. Id. at 1377.
41. Id. In Kopper Bright Aggregates, a partner in BNS Partners, was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Beazer, PLC. (Beazer). Id. Bright Aggregates was the mananging partner of BNS
Partners. Id. Speedward Ltd., a partner in BNS Partners, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
NatWest Investment Bank Ltd., a subsidiary of National Westminister Bank PLC. Id. As part
of the partners' plan to gain control of Koppers Co., BNS Partners was to acquire shares of
Koppers stock before another entity that the partners formed, BNS Inc., made a tender offer.
Id.
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Partners, Shearson Lehman, Bright Aggregates, Inc., and Speedward Ltd.
formed BNS, Inc. to make a tender offer for Koppers stock.4 2 To fund
BNS, Inc.'s approximate $1.7 billion tender offer for Koppers stock, Citibank agreed to provide $864 million in loans, Shearson Lehman agreed to
contribute $570 million in capital, and Bright Aggregates' sole shareholder,
Beazer PLC, agreed to contribute $298 million in capital. 43 In commencing
the tender offer for Koppers' stock, BNS, Inc., Bright Aggregates, and
Beazer PLC filed separate disclosure documents with the SEC.4 Shearson
Lehman, however, did not file any disclosure statements in connection with
BNS, Inc.'s tender offer.4 Koppers, in seeking to enjoin BNS, Inc.'s tender
offer in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, claimed that Shearson Lehman violated the Williams Act by
failing to make disclosures under the Williams Act and the SEC tender
offer regulations.

46

In analyzing Koppers' request for a preliminary injunction, the district
court in Koppers initially noted the sparcity of case law addressing the
definition of the term "bidder" under the Williams Act or SEC tender
offer regulations.4 7 The Koppers court, however, recognized a few guidelines
from prior cases for determining whether a party to a tender offer is a
bidder subject to the SEC disclosure requirements. 4 First, the Koppers court
stated that investors who form a shell company with the investors' own

shares of the target company to make a tender offer are not bidders if the
49
investors have no additional commitments to finance the tender offer.

42. Id. In Koppers Bright Aggregates, Speedward Ltd. and Shearson Lehman entered
into an agreement concerning the ownership and control of BNS, Inc. Id. at 1385. Pursuant
to the terms of the BNS, Inc. Stockholder Agreement (Agreement), BNS, Inc. would issue
three classes of stock. Id. According to the Agreement, Bright Aggregates would own all of
the 490 shares of BNS, Inc. Class A stock and SL-Merger, Shearson Lehman's subsidiary,
would own 461 shares of BNS, Inc. Class B stock. Id. Additionally, the Agreement provided
that Speedward would own 24 shares of BNS, Inc. Class B stock and 25 shares of BNS, Inc.
Class C stock. Id. Moreover, Bright Aggregates, pursuant to the Agreement's division of
voting rights between the classes of stock, could control approximately 80% of the voting
power of BNS, Inc. and could elect six of the eight members of BNS, Inc's Board of Directors.
Id. Under the Agreement, Bright Aggregates had an option to purchase at a fixed price SLMerger's and Speedward's interest in BNS, Inc. Id. at 1387. The Agreement also provided
that SL-Merger and Speedward had options to force Bright Aggregates to purchase all the
Class B and Class C stock of BNS, Inc. Id. Pursuant to the Agreement, if BNS, Inc.'s tender
offer for Koppers stock was successful, the partners in BNS Partners would disslove the
partnership by transferring the Koppers stock that BNS Partners owned to BNS, Inc. Id. at
1378.
43. Id. at 1378.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 1380. In seeking to enjoin BNS, Inc.'s tender offer, Koppers alleged that
Shearson Lehman's activities in BNS Inc.'s tender offer made Shearson Lehman a bidder
under SEC regulations. Id. at 1387-1388.
47. Id. at 1388.
48. Id.

49. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1388. In stating that investors are not bidders if they form
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Second, the Koppers court stated that mere status as majority shareholder
in the parent company of the bidder without financial participation in the

tender offer is not enough to render the majority shareholder a bidder.50
Finally, the Koppers court explained that parties that are the motivating
force in forming and capitalizing a tender offeror are bidders subject to

disclosure requirements of the SEC tender offer regulations.5 1

After articulating guidelines for determining whether a party to a tender

offer is subject to the Williams Act and SEC disclosure requirements, the
district court in Koppers applied the guidelines to determine whether Shear-

son Lehman's activities in BNS, Inc.'s tender offer required Shearson
52
Lehman to make disclosures to the SEC and Koppers' shareholders.

Reviewing minutes of negotiations between Shearson Lehman and Beazer
PLC, the Koppers court first determined that Shearson Lehman intended

to play an aggressive role in the tender offer for Koppers' stock. 5 3 As
evidence of Shearson Lehman's aggressive role, the district court noted
Shearson Lehman's direct equity investments in the partnership that acquired
Koppers' stock prior to the tender offer and in BNS, Inc., the corporation
that would make the actual tender offer. 54 Moreover, the Koppers court

noted that Shearson Lehman's commitment of $570 million in capital to
fund BNS, Inc.'s tender offer for Koppers stock would allow Shearson
Lehman to acquire additional interests in BNS, Inc.5 5 Additionally, the

district court in Koppers recognized that Shearson Lehman would receive

the offeror with shares of the target company but have no additional financial commitment
to the offeror, the Koppers court relied on the district court's decision in Warnco, Inc. v.
Galef. Id.; see Warnco, Inc. v. Galef, No. B-86-146, slip op. at 13-16 (D. Conn. April 3,
1986) (holding that investors that only form entity that makes tender offer without commitment
from investors to finance tender offer are not bidders).
50. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1388. In stating that a party with majority ownership in
the parent of the offeror but without further financial participation in the tender offer is not
a bidder, the Koppers court relied on the district court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry
Pride, Inc. Id.; see Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804, 814, (D. Del. 1985)
(determining that corporations that controlled parent of company making tender offer were
not bidders under SEC tender offer regulations because corporations had not participated
either in capitalizing bidder or in financing bidder's tender offer).
51. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1388. In stating that the two individuals who form and
capitalize an entity for the sole purpose of making the tender offer are bidders, the Koppers
court relied on PabstBrewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz. Id.; see Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz,
551 F. Supp. 882, 891-892 (D. Del. 1982) (determining that persons that form and capitalize
company to make tender offer are bidders subject to disclosure requirements of Williams Act
and SEC tender offer regulations).
52. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1389.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing terms of BNS, Inc.
Stockholder Agreement).
55. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1390. Pursuant to an arrangement with BNS, Inc., Shearson
Lehman would receive either notes or preferred stock from BNS, Inc. for contributing $570
million to finance BNS, Inc.'s tender offer for Koppers stock. Id. If Shearson Lehman received
preferred stock in BNS, Inc., Shearson Lehman would gain limited voting rights that accompanied the preferred stock. Id.
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large fees for advising BNS, Inc. and for underwriting a portion of the
financing of the tender offer for Koppers stock.5 6 After analyzing all of
Shearson Lehman's activities in BNS, Inc.'s tender offer for Koppers stock,
the district court in Koppers reasoned that Shearson Lehman's role far
surpassed the typical investment banker's role in a tender offer.57 The
Koppers court, therefore, determined that Shearson Lehman played a central, motivating role in forming and capitalizing the tender offer for Koppers
58
stock.
After determining that Shearson Lehman played a principal role in
forming and capitalizing BNS, Inc., the Koppers court interpreted the text
and legislative history of the Williams Act to determine whether the Williams
Act required Shearson Lehman to make disclosures to the SEC and to
Koppers shareholders.5 9 In interpreting the Williams Act the court in Koppers
determined that Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, intended that the
disclosure requirements would insure that shareholders would have an
opportunity to make an informed decision on a tender offer. 0 The Koppers
court reasoned that shareholders in a tender offer would find information
concerning the financial condition of a principal investor in the bidder
particularly important because of the impact the principal investor may have
on the success of the tender offer and the future of the surviving company.6'
The Koppers court further determined that, in enacting the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act, Congress intended to provide the SEC
and the Federal Reserve Board the opportunity to monitor tender offers
for violations of federal securities laws. 62 The Koppers court reasoned that
information concerning Shearson Lehman may aid the SEC in identifying
conflicts of interest and breaches of fiduciary duty that may arise from
Shearson Lehman's activities as a broker or dealer in Koppers stock and as
an investor in the bidder for Koppers stock. 63 Accordingly, the district court
in Koppers determined that disclosures from Shearson Lehman would have
aided Koppers shareholders and the federal agencies that monitor tender

56. Id. In Koppers BNS Inc. agreed to pay Shearson Lehman fees for underwriting
shares of Koppers stock that shareholders tendered and for underwriting the $570 million in
financing for the tender offer. Id. Shearson Lehman also stood to make a 25% compounded
annual return on its equity investment in BNS, Inc. Id.
57. Id. In determining that Shearson Lehman's role in BNS, Inc's tender offer for
Koppers stock exceeded the advisory and intermediary role that investment banks usually play
in tender offers, the Koppers court characterized Shearson Lehman's participation in BNS,
Inc.'s tender offer as "novel". Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.; see infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers court's
analysis of Williams Act).
60. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1390; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Williams Act).
61. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1391. In Koppers, the Koppers court reasoned that Shearson
Lehman's multiple roles in BNS, Inc.'s tender offer for Koppers stock may present conflict
of interest issues for Shearson Lehman that would be important to Koppers shareholders. Id.
62. Id.at 1390.
63. Id.at 1391.
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offers. 64 Conceding that Shearson Lehman owned less than fifty percent of

the bidder, BNS, Inc., and had limited voting rights in BNS, Inc., the
Koppers court nonetheless determined that Shearson Lehman's principal

participation as planner, investor, and financier in BNS, Inc.'s tender offer
for Koppers stock subjected Shearson Lehman to the disclosure requirements
of the Williams Act and the SEC tender offer regulations 65 The district
court in Koppers, therefore, granted Koppers' request to enjoin BNS, Inc.'s
tender offer until Shearson Lehman disclosed financial information to the
SEC and to shareholders of Koppers in accordance with the Williams Act
66
and SEC tender offer regulations.
In contrast to the principal paritcipant test that the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania applied in Koppers, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in City Capital
Associates Ltd. Partnership. v. Interco Inc.6 7 articulated a control test in
considering whether an investment bank participating in a tender offer is a
bidder and, therefore, subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act.6 8 In Interco an investment banking firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. (Drexel Burnham), agreed to arrange financing and to act as an advisor
for Cardinal Acquisition Corp. (Cardinal) in Cardinal's tender offer for
Interco Inc. (Interco) stock.6 9 Pursuant to its agreement with Cardinal,
Drexel Burnham was to arrange $1.375 billion in financing for Cardinal's
proposed tender offer by selling debt or preferred securities of Cardinal.70
Cardinal, as partial compensation to Drexel Burnham and to facilitate the
sale of Cardinal's preferred securities, agreed to provide Drexel Burnham
with an option to purchase or to sell to investors a maximum of thirty-six
percent of Cardinal's common equity. 7" Cardinal and the principal owners
64. Id. at 1391-1392.
65. Id. at 1390.
66. Id. at 1407.
67. 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
68. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1988).
69. Id. at 62. In Interco, a shell corporation, Cardinal Holdings Corp. owned the
common equity in Cardinal Acquisition Corp. Id. at 61. A partnership, City Capital, owned
all the common equity of Cardinal Holdings Corp. Id. City Partnership had two general
partners, City GP I, Inc. and City GP II, Inc., and each partner owned 49% of City
Partnership, Id. An individual, Steven Rales was sole stockholder in City GP I, Inc. Id. Steven
Rales' brother, Mitchell Rales, was sole stockholder in City GP II, Inc. Id,
70. Id. In addition to the $1.375 billion that Drexel Burnham agreed to provide for
Cardinal's tender offer, Cardinal agreed to borrow $1.225 billion from a sydicate of commercial
banks to complete the financing of Cardinal's tender offer. Id.
71, Id. Pursuant to Drexel Buriham's agreement with Cardinal, the percentage of
Cardinal's common equity that Drexel Burnham would receive from Cardinal depended on
the amount of preferred stock of Cardinal that Drexel Burnham would have to sell to fund
Cardinal's tender offer. Id. In addition to receiving an option to purchase a common equity
interest in Cardinal, Drexel Burnham in compensation for arranging the financing for Cardinal's
tender offer, would receive 1.125% of the amount of written financing commitments that
Drexel Burnham secured and 3% to 5% of the total amount of debt or preferred securities
of Cardinal that Drexel Burnham sold. Id. Drexel Burnham also would receive as compensation
$3 million in fees for advising Cardinal and for managing the tender offer. Id.
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of Cardinal filed disclosure statements with the SEC or with Interco shareholders. 72 Drexel Burnham, however, did not file disclosure statements with
the SEC or with Interco shareholders.71 Contending that Drexel Burnham's
failure to file disclosure statements violated the Williams Act, Interco
requested the United States District Court for the District of Deleware to
enjoin Cardinal's tender offer for Interco stock. 74 After the district court
offer, 75 Interco appealed
denied Interco's request to enjoin Cardinal's tender
76
the district court's decision to the Third Circuit.
On appeal the Third Circuit in Interco considered whether Drexel
Burnham was subject to disclosure requirements under the Williams Act
and SEC tender offer regulations. 77 Initially, the Interco court determined
that the fees that Cardinal paid Drexel Burnham to advise Cardinal and to
arrange financing for Cardinal's tender offer for Koppers stock were irrelevant to the issue of whether Drexel Burnham must make disclosures to the
SEC and to Koppers' shareholders. 7s Noting that Cardinal also gave Drexel
Burnham an option to acquire common stock in Cardinal, the Third Circuit
determined that Drexel Burnham was a'minority investor in Cardinal. 79 The
Interco court, however, reasoned that Cardinal by giving Drexel Burnham
an option to acquire common stock in Cardinal, had not surrendered control
of the tender offer to Drexel Burnham. 0 Accordingly, the court in Interco
considered only whether the Williams Act requires a bidder's minority

72. Id. at 61-62. In Koppers, Cardinal, Cardinal Holdings Corp., City Capital Partnership, City GP I, Inc., City GP II, Inc., Steven Rales, and Mitchell Rales filed separate
disclosure forms with the SEC on the day that Cardinal commenced the tender offer for
Interco stock. Id. The disclosure statements that the parties filed disclosed that Drexel Burnham
was the subject an SEC civil enforcement action and that Drexel Burnham had received
subpoenas from a New York grand jury to testify in the enforcement action. Id. at 62.
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551, 1558 (D.
Del. 1988). In denying Interco's request to enjoin Cardinal's tender offer, the district court in
Interco held that Drexel Burnham was not a bidder. Id. The Interco district court reasoned
that, because Drexel Burnham did not control the bidder, Drexel Burnham was not subject to
the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act or the SEC tender offer regulations. Id. In
determining that Drexel Burnham was not a bidder, the district court in Interco acknowledged
that by holding an option to purchase between 29% and 36% of Cardinal's common stock,
Drexel Burnham was dangerously close to being a bidder under the Williams Act and the SEC
tender offer regulations. Id.
76. Interco, 860 F.2d at 63.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 64. In determining that Drexel Burnham was a minority investor in Cardinal,
the Interco court assumed that, if Cardinal's tender offer succeeded, Drexel Burnham would
exercise the option to purchase 36% of Cardinal's common stock and become a minority
investor in Cardinal. Id. at 63.
80. Id. The court in Interco reasoned that, because Capital City retained at least 63%
ownership in Cardinal, Capital City and its owners, the Rales brothers, would control the
tender offer. Id.
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shareholder that does not exercise control over a tender offer to make
disclosures."'

In considering whether a minority investor in a bidder must file disclosure statements with the SEC under the Williams Act, the Interco court
initially determined that the court should defer to the SEC's interpretation
of the Williams Act.8 The Interco court reasoned that Congress entrusted

the SEC with interpreting, administrating, and enforcing the federal securities laws.83 Noting that the SEC tender offer regulations define a bidder

as any person who makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender offer
is made, the Interco court acknowledged that a court could interpret the
SEC's definition of a bidder to include stockholders of the corporation that
makes a tender offer.84 The court in Interco, however, reasoned that the
term "bidder" in the SEC tender offer regulations describes only the person
or entity that intends to purchase the shares that shareholders tender."5 The

Interco court noted that, in the SEC regulations, the SEC distinguishes
between the party that intends to purchase the tendered stock (bidder) and
a person that owns stock in the bidder. 6 The Interco court further noted
that, pursuant to the SEC instructions for filing disclosure statements, a
person that controls the bidder must file a disclosure statement but does
not have to make financial disclosures unless the controlling person's
7
financial condition is material to shareholders' decision in a tender offer.
Noting that Drexel Burnham was not the bidder and did not control the
bidder, the Interco court concluded that the SEC tender offer regulations

did not require Drexel Burnham to make disclosures to the SEC or to
Interco shareholders. 8 Accordingly, the Interco court held that Drexel
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id. In Interco the Third Circuit determined that courts should defer to the SEC's
interpretation of the Williams Act unless the SEC's interpretation conflicts with the mandate
of the Williams Act. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating SEC's definition of term
"bidder").
85. Interco, 860 F.2d at 64. The Interco court, in interpeting the SEC's definition of
the term "bidder", referred to the SEC's instruction for completing a disclosure statement as
an example of the SEC's use of the term "bidder". Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (Item 9
of Special Instructions for Complying with Schd. 14D-l) (1988) (governing bidder's financial
disclosures).
86. Interco, 860 F.2d. at 64. The Interco court reasoned that, because the SEC instructions
for complying with Schedule 14D-I do not identify a bidder as the person that controls the
entity making the tender offer, the term "bidder" does not include stockholders of the entity
making the tender offer. Id.; see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing SEC
disclosure requirements for financial information of bidders and persons that control bidders).
87. Interco, 860 F.2d at 64; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (Item 9 of Special Instruction
for Complying with Schd. 14D-1) (1988) (stating that the controlling entity of a bidder that is
not a natural person must file disclosure statement with SEC and target company's shareholders); supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing SEC tender offer regulations).
88. Interco, 860 F.2d at 65. In Interco the Third Circuit determined that Interco had
not proved that Drexel Burnham's financial information was material to Interco shareholders
even after Interco had gained access to Drexel Burnham's financial statements through discovery
at trial. Id.
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Burnham's failure to make financial disclosures did not violate the Williams
Act and, therefore, affirmed the district court's refusal to enjoin Cardinal's
tender offer.8 9

Disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of the Williams Act and
the majority's conclusion that Drexel Burnham did not have to file disclosure
statements, the dissenting opinion in Interco articulated a separate test for
determining whether an investment bank that has a minority equity interest
in a bidder is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act
and the SEC tender offer regulations. ° In contrast to the majority's reliance
on the SEC's interpretation of the Williams Act, the Interco dissenting
opinion noted that the language of the Williams Act that governs a tender

offeror's duty to disclose information to shareholders of the target company
does not include the terms "bidder" or "control". 91 Rather than analyzing
the SEC's term "bidder", the dissenting opinion in Interco analyzed the
text of the Williams Act that requires a person that would be a beneficial

owner of more than five percent of the target company's registered stock
if the tender offer is successful to make disclosures to the SEC and to the
target company's shareholders. 92 The dissenting opinion also noted that the
Williams Act delegates to the SEC the authority to require additional

information in disclosures, not the authority to decide who must file
disclosures.93 Accordingly, the dissenting opinion maintained that, by using
and defining the term "bidder", the SEC could not determine the parties

in a tender offer that must file disclosure statements under the Williams

Act. 94 The dissenting opinion, therefore, interpreted the SEC's use of the

term "bidder" as a general term for those parties participating in a tender
offer that the provisions of the Williams Act require to make disclosures. 9
89. Id.

90. Id. at 65-66 (Weis, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 66; see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (reviewing provisions of
Williams Act that describe parties that must make disclosures).
92. Interco, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting); see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (requiring any person in tender offer that, upon consummation of tender
offer, would be beneficial owner of more than 5% of class of target company's registered
stock to make disclosures to SEC).
93. Interco, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting); see supra note 24 and accompanying
text (stating provision of Williams Act that delegates authority to SEC to require specific
disclosure information).
94. Interco, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting).
95. Id. In Interco the dissenting opinion stated that a court should attempt to interpret
administrative agencies' regulations as not conflicting with federal statutes. Id. Accordingly,
in interpreting the SEC's definition of "bidder" as a general term for a person in a tender
offer that must make disclosures, the dissenting opinion in Interco read the term "bidder" in
the SEC regulations in harmony with the language of the Williams Act. Id. The dissenting
opinion reasoned that, if the majority's interpretation of the term "bidder" is correct, the
SEC regulations conflict with the language of the Williams Act. Id. The dissenting opinion in
Interco explained that the majority's interpretation of the term "bidder" narrows the Williams
Act's scope by not requiring some parties to make disclosures that the Williams Act requires
to make disclosures. Id. The dissenting opinion in Interco, therefore, determined that if the
SEC's definition of the term "bidder" narrowed the scope of the Williams Act, the SEC had
exceeded the authority that Congress granted the SEC in the Williams Act. Id.
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After maintaining that the SEC lacked the authority to define the parties
in a tender offer that must make disclosures, the dissenting opinion in
Interco analyzed the legislative history of the Williams Act to determine
Congress' intent in regulating tender offers. 96 The dissenting opinion reasoned that Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, intended to require
persons that make a tender offer to gain control of a company to make
disclosures to shareholders of the target company. 97 The dissenting opinion,
in contrast to the majority's reasoning in Interco, reasoned that the language
and legislative history of the Williams Act do not indicate that Congress
only intended an entity that controls or dominates the entity making the
tender offer to make disclosures. 98 The dissenting opinion maintained that
Congress was concerned with requiring disclosures from all parties that
acquire, by any means, benficial ownership of a company's registered stock. 99
Noting that requiring disclosure from all parties that combine to make a
tender offer sometimes may be excessive, the dissenting opinion, nonetheless,
reasoned that the effect on shareholders from receiving excessive information
would be harmless. 1' The dissenting opinion in Interco, however, reasoned
that inadequate disclosure in a tender offer could harm shareholders of the
target company. 101 Accordingly, the dissenting opinion maintained that, to
determine which parties in a tender offer must make disclosures under the
Williams Act, a court should consider whether a party would have beneficial

96. Id.
97. Id. at 66-67. In analyzing the legislative history of the Williams Act, the dissenting
opinion in Interco determined that Congress intended that the term "person" have the same
meaning in the Williams Act's tender offer provisions as in the provision of the Williams Act
that requires disclosure from a "person" that receives beneficial ownership of more than a
certain percentage of the common securities in a publicly held company through purchases in
the stock market. Id. at 66; see also H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2818 (discussing
intent of Congress in defining "person" in Williams Act); compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring person that would acquire beneficial ownership of more
than 57a of class of target company's registered stock upon consummation of tender offer to
file disclosures) with 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring person that
acquires beneficial ownership of more than 507 of class of company's registered stock to make
disclosures).
98. Interco, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis, J., dissenting). But see supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text (discussing Interco court's reasoning that, under the Williams Act, only
bidder and entity that controls bidder must make disclosures to SEC and target company
shareholders).
99. Interco, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis, J., dissenting). In maintaining that Congress intended
to require disclosures from all parties that combine to make a tender offer, the dissenting
opinion in Interco referred to the legislative history of the Williams Act that states that the
Williams Act provides for full disclosure of the identity of any person that acquires more than
10% of a company's registered stock. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2814
(intending to make disclosure requirements for tender offers like disclosure requirements in
proxy contests).
100. Interco, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis, J., dissenting).
101. Id. Maintaining that inadequate disclosure could harm shareholders, the dissenting
opinion in Interco interpreted the Williams Act's disclosure provisions liberally to allow
shareholder to receive informations from all parties that combine to make a tender offer. Id.
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ownership of stock in the target company if the tender offer succeeds

(beneficial ownership test).10 2
After articulating the beneficial ownership test for determining whether
a party to a tender offer must make disclosures to the SEC and to
shareholders of the target company, the dissenting opinion in Interco

considered whether Drexel Burnham was a beneficial owner of Interco stock
and, therefore, subject to disclosures requirements of the Williams Act. 03

The dissenting opinion determined that because Drexel Burnham had the
option to purchase common equity of the acquiring company in Cardinal's
4
tender offer, Drexel Burnham was a beneficial owner of Interco stockA'
Accordingly, the dissenting opinion maintained that, as a beneficial owner,
Drexel Burnham must make disclosures to the SEC and to Interco shareholders.105 The dissenting opinion, however, did not determine whether

6
financial information from Drexel was material to Interco shareholders."'
The Interco dissenting opinion, therefore, in maintaining that Drexel Burn-

ham is subject to the disclosure requirements under the Williams Act,

contended that the majority should have remanded the case to district court
for a determination on whether financial information from Drexel Burnham
is material to Interco shareholders. 0 7
IV.

Comparision of Control Test, PrincipalParticipantTest and
Beneficial Ownership Test

The Interco dissenting opinion, the Interco majority opinion, and the
Koppers court's decision present three different tests for determining whether

an investment bank that participates in a tender offer must make disclosures
under the Williams Act. 08 First, the dissenting opinion in Interco presents
a beneficial ownership test to determine whether an investment bank that
participates in a tender offer must file a disclosure statement."' 9 Under the

102. Id.
103. Id. at 69-70.
104. Id. at 69. In addition to determining that Drexel Burnham was a beneficial owner
of Interco stock, the dissenting opinion in Interco determined that Drexel Burnham played a
critical role in Cardinal's tender offer for Interco stock. Id. The dissenting opinion reasoned
that Drexel Burnham's option to purchase common stock in Cardinal demonstrated the
importance of Drexel Burnham's role of arranging financing for Cardinal's tender offer. Id.
105. Id. at 69.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 70. In determining that the majority should have remanded the issue of whether
Drexel Burnham's financial information is material to Interco shareholders, the dissenting
opinion in Interco reasoned that materiality of financial information is a factual issue. Id.
108. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60i 65-70 (3d Cir.
1988) (Weiss, J., dissenting); Interco, 860 F.2d at 64-65; Koppers v. American Express Co.,
689 F. Supp. 1371, 1388-1390 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see supra notes 51, 87-88, 96 and accompanying
text (discussing courts' tests for determining whether investment bank that had equity investment
in bidding corporation must make disclosures to SEC and to target company's shareholders).
109. Interco, 860 F.2d at 65-68 (Weis, J., dissenting); see supra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text (discussing Interco dissent's beneficial ownership test).
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beneficial ownership test, if an investment bank that invests in a bidder
would own more than five percent of the target company's registered stock
upon consummation of the tender offer, the investment bank must make
disclosures to the SEC and to the target company's shareholders.110 Second,
the majority in Interco presents a control test."' Under the control test, an
investment bank that owns the control block of stock of the tender offeror
1 12
must make disclosures to the SEC and to the target company shareholders.
Third, the district court's decision in Koppers presents the principal participant test to determine whether an investment bank that participates in the
tender offer must make disclosures." 3 Under the principal participant test,
an investment bank is not subject to the Williams Act's disclosure requirements unless the investment bank has an equity interest in the bidder and
plays a significant role in forming and financing the bidder." 4 The beneficial
ownership test, the control test, and the principal participant test purport
to make the requirement for financial disclosures from an investment bank
subject to the materiality of the information to the shareholders' decisions
whether to tender or to retain shares in the target company." 5 Moreover,
a court can apply each test to all parties that combine to form the entity
that actually makes the tender offer." 6 In application, however, only the
beneficial ownership test conforms to the language of the Williams Act and

110. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's determination that Drexel Burnham must make disclosures).
111. Interco, 860 F.2d at 64-65; see supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing
court's holding in Interco that Drexel Burnham was not bidder because Drexel Burnham did
not control tender offer).
112. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Interco majority's interpretation
of SEC regulations that require person that controls bidder to make disclosures).
113. Koppers v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1388-1390 (W.D. Pa. 1988);
see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers court determination that parties
playing important role in forming and capitalizing bidder are subject to disclosure requirements
of Williams Act).
114. See Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1390 (determining that, because Shearson Lehman
significantly participated in forming and capitalizing bidder, BNS, Inc., Shearson Lehman
must make disclosures to SEC and Koppers' shareholders).
115. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Koopers court's determination
that financial information from investment bank would be material to target company's
shareholders); supranote 88 and accompanying text (discussing Interco majority's determination
that plaintiff failed to show financial information from investment bank was material to target
company's shareholders); supra note 105-106 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's reasoning that Third Circuit should remand case to district court for
determination of materiality of investment bank's financial information).
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating that Koppers court analyzed
activities of persons that created bidding entity in tender offer to determine which parties must
make disclosures under Williams Act); supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Interco
majority's reasoning that person that controlled entity making a tender offer must make
disclosures under Williams Act); supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Interco
dissenting opinion's reasoning that Congress intended all parties that combined to make tender
offer to make disclosures under Williams Act).
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promotes the policies that Congress intended to promote in enacting the
7
Williams Act."
The Interco majority's control test does not conform to the language
of the Williams Act and does not promote the policies that Congress
intended to promote in enacting the Williams Act." s The Interco majority,
instead of analyzing the text of the Williams Act, deferred to the SEC's
interpretation of the Williams Act as expressed in the SEC's tender offer
regulations." 9 In deferring to the SEC's interpretation of the Williams Act,
the Interco majority only analyzed the instructions that the SEC provides
persons that are filing a disclosure statement. 20 The SEC filing instructions
state that only the bidder or person that controls the bidder must file a
disclosure statement.12 ' The language of the Williams Act, however, does
not indicate that only the dominant or controlling party of the entity that
makes a tender offer must make disclosures. 122 Instead, the language of
Williams Act states that any person that would be the beneficial owner of
more than five percent of the target company's registered stock must make
disclosures. 23 Moreover, the language of the Williams Act only empowers
the SEC to decide the specific information that a bidder must disclose, not
which parties in a tender offer must make disclosures.' 24 The majority in
Interco should have examined the text of the Williams Act and should have
determined that any SEC attempt to limit the parties in a tender offer that
must make disclosures under the Williams Act exceeded the SEC's authority. 125

117. See infra notes 118-154 and accompanying text (analyzing beneficial ownership test,
control test, and principal participant test).
118. See infra notes 119-133 and accompanying text (analyzing Interco majority's control
test).
119. Interco, 860 F.2d at 64; see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing
Interco majority's deference to SEC's instruction for disclosure statement form); supra notes
24-28 and accompanying text (discussing SEC regulations that govern which parties in tender
offer must make disclosures).
120. See Interco, 860 F.2d at 64-65 (analyzing SEC's instructions for content of disclosure
statements).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1988) (Item 9 of Special Instructions for Complying with
Sch. 14D-1); see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing SEC instructions on
which parties must file disclosure statement with SEC).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing language of Williams Act that identifies parties that must make
disclosures).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 21-22 (discussing
language of Williams Act that identifies parties that must make disclosures).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 23 (discussing language
of Williams Act that authorizes SEC to determine specific information that bidder must disclose
to protect shareholders of target company and public).
125. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text (discussing language of Williams Act
and authority that Williams Act grants SEC); see generally International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20, (1979) (reasoning that courts should not defer
to SEC when SEC's position is in conflict with language and purpose of statute); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that
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In addition to failing to conforming to the language of the Williams
Act, the Interco majority's control test does not promote the policies that
Congress intended to promote in enacting the Williams Act. 2 6 Congress
enacted the Williams Act because Congress was concerned that shareholders
of a target company were not receiving information that was material to
the shareholder's decision whether to tender or to retain shares in the target
company. 127 Congress reasoned that disclosures from all parties that would
obtain beneficial ownership of registered stock from a successful tender
28
offer were material to a shareholder's evaluation of a bidder's tender offer.
Under the Interco majority's control test, however, an investment bank that
is a minority investor in a entity making a tender offer, such as Drexel
Burnham in Interco, could evade the Williams Act's disclosure requirements. 29 The Interco court's interpretation of the SEC instructions as
requiring only the controlling person of the bidder to make disclosures,
therefore, frustrates Congress' intent to require all persons that would aquire
beneficial ownership of the target company's stock to make disclosures to
30
the SEC and to shareholders of the target company.
The Interco court, facing a possible conflict between the stated legislative
purpose of a statute and an administrative agency's regulations, should have
attempted to interpret the SEC tender offer regulations in harmony with
the Williams Act and thus have avoided the conflict.' The Interco court
courts should uphold SEC's regulations and interpretations of federal security laws only when
SEC's regulations and interpretations are consistent with purpose of statute and have rational
basis).
126. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text (analyzing control test's failure to
promote policies of Williams Act).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2812-13 (intending that Williams Act
would provide shareholders in tender offer with all relevant facts, including identity of
participants in tender offer so shareholders could make informed investment decision); see also
supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Williams Act).
128. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2813 (stating that, if shareholders of
target company received information from all persons that sought control of target company,
information may affect shareholders's opinion on tender offer). In enacting the Williams Act,
Congress reasoned that, by requiring all persons that sought control of a company through a
tender offer to make disclosures, shareholders could assess the company's future and the
probability that the tender offer would be successful. Id. at 2812; see also supra notes 5-6,
21-22 and accompanying text (discussing language and legislative intent of Williams Act).
129. See supra note 87-89 (discussing Interco majority determination that Williams Act
and SEC tender offer regulations did not require Drexel Burnham, minority investor in entity
that made tender offer, to make disclosures).
130. Compare supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing that under Interco
majority's control test, minority investor in bidder can escape disclosure requirements of
Williams Act) with supra note 6 (discussing legislative history of Williams Act that indicates
Congress enacted Williams Act to require full disclosure from person that beneficially would
own registered stock through contract or other arrangement).
131. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 64 (3d. Cir.
1988) (reasoning that Interco court should defer to SEC tender offer regulations unless
regulations conflict with congressional mandate of Williams Act); Id., at 66 (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that Interco court should interpret SEC tender offer regulations to not
conflict with Williams Act).
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could have avoided a conflict between legislative intent and administrative
agency's interpretation of the Williams Act by determining that the SEC
instruction for complying with the disclosure statement was not the SEC's
interpretation of the Williams Act but only an aid to parties that must
make disclosures under the Williams Act. 32 In interpreting the legislative
history and language of the Williams Act, the Interco court should have
emphasized Congress' intent in enacting the Williams Act rather than
deferring to SEC instructions for completing a disclosure form as the SEC's
33
interpretation of the Williams Act.
Similar to the Interco majority's control test, the Koppers court's
principal participant test is inconsistent with the language and the policies
of the Williams Act. 34 In applying the principal participant test, the Koppers
court evaluated the nature and degree of an investment bank's activity in
the formation and capitalization of a bidder to determine if the investment
bank must file a disclosure statement with the SEC. 35 Specifically, under
the the Koppers court's principal participant test, a party participating in a
tender offer must make disclosures to the SEC and the target company's
shareholders only if the party has a direct equity investment in the bidder
and plays a central role in forming and capitalizing the bidder.' 36 The text
of the Williams Act, however, states that beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of a target company's securities, not the level of the party's
activities in the tender offer, is the trigger for requiring disclosures from a
party in a tender offer. 37 Accordingly, by emphasizing the nature and degree
of a party's participation in a tender offer instead of the party's potential
beneficial ownership of the target company's stock, the principal participation test fails to conform to the language of the Williams Act. 3
In addition to failing to conform to the language of the Williams Act,
the principal participant test frustrates the policies underlying the Williams
132. See id. at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting) (reasoning that Interco court could have interpreted
term "bidder" under SEC tender offer regulations as general term for person under Williams
Act); see supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's interpretation of SEC's term "bidder").
133. See supra notes 121-124 (discussing differences between Williams Act and SEC tender
offer regulations); supra note 130-132 and accompanying text (discussing Interco majority's
decision to defer to SEC's interpretation of Williams Act only if SEC's interpretation is not
in conflict with congressional mandate of Williams Act).
134. See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text (analyzing principal participant test).
135. See Koppers v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1388-1390 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (analyzing Shearson Lehman's activities in forming and capitalizing bidder, BNS, Inc.);
see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers court's analysis of investment
bank's activities in tender offer to determine if investment bank must make disclosures).
136. See Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1390 (determining that because Shearson Lehman
played important role in forming and capitalizing bidder, Shearson Lehman must make
disclosures to SEC and to Koppers' shareholders).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring all persons that would
receive beneficial ownership of more than 5% of company's registered stock upon successful
tender offer to make disclosures to SEC and target company's shareholders).
138. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between principal
participant test and language of Williams Act).
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Act. 13 9 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress intended to require all parties
that seek to gain control of a company through a tender offer to make
disclosures to the SEC and to the company's shareholders. 140 In requiring

all parties that participate in a tender offer to make disclosures, Congress
intended to assure that, before the terms of a tender offer forced share-

holders to make a decision, shareholders of the target company would
receive information concerning the persons that would own more than five
percent of the target company if the tender offer succeeded.14' The Koppers

court's principal participant test, however, would require only the parties
that have significant roles in forming and capitalizing the entity that makes
the tender offer to disclose information to the SEC and to the target
company's shareholders. 42 By requiring only the principal participants in a
tender offer to make disclosures, the principal participant test would not
provide shareholders with all the information that Congress intended the
target company shareholders to receive. 43 The principal participant test,
44
therefore, frustrates the full disclosure policy of the Williams Act.
In contrast to the control test and the principal participant test, the

Interco dissenting opinion's beneficial ownership test is consistent with the
language and policies of the Williams Act. 145 The Interco dissenting opinion
correctly noted that the Williams Act does not contain language which
provides that only the dominant or controlling entities in a tender offer are
subject to the disclosure requirements.' 46 In articulating the beneficial own-

139. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (comparing principal participant test
and policies underlying Williams Act).
140. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2813. In enacting the Williams Act, Congress
intended to provide the same disclosure requirements in tender offers as required in proxy
contests. Id. In regulating proxy contests, Congress requires disclosure filings to inform
shareholders of the identity of the participants and the participants' associates. Id. Congress,
in enacting the Williams Act, therefore, intended to inform shareholders of the target company
with the identity of the persons that combined to make a tender offer. Id. at 2814; see
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp. 409 F.2d 937, 945 (2d Cir. 1969)
(analogizing tender offer regulations to proxy contest regulations).
141. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2813 (intending that shareholders receive
information concerning persons that combine to make tender offer so shareholders could make
informed investment decision); see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Williams Act).
142. See Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1388-90 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (presenting principal participant test).
143. Compare supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent that all
persons that wold receive beneficial ownership of more than 5% of target company's registered
stock upon successful tender offer to make disclosures) with supra note 142 and accompanying
text (discussing parties that must make disclosures under principal participant test).
144. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between principal
participant test and Congress' intent in enacting Williams Act).
145. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (analyzing Interco dissenting opinion's
beneficial ownership test).
146. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 68 (Weis,
J., dissenting) (3d Cir. 1988) (analyzing language of Williams Act); see also supra note 91-92
and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's reasoning that Williams Act
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ership test, the Interco dissenting opinion directly cited the language of the

Williams Act which states that a person that would own more than five
percent of the target company's stock upon a successful tender offer is
subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. 47 Accordingly,
by requiring disclosure from any person in a tender offer, including an
investment bank, that would own more than five percent of the target
company's stock upon a succeessful tender offer, the beneficial ownership

4
test conforms to the language of the Williams Act. 1
In addition to conforming to the language of the Williams Act, the

beneficial ownership test promotes the policies that Congress intended to

promote in enacting the Williams Act. 49 Congress, in enacting the Williams
Act, intended to prevent a group of persons that formed an entity in a
tender offer from evading disclosures to shareholders.1 0 In particular,

Congress intended to protect shareholders of target companies by requiring
full disclosure from persons that would own a portion of the target company's stock upon the successful completion of the tender offer.' 5' Congress
reasoned that shareholders would need information from the potential
owners to evaluate the potential owners' impact on the future of the

company.1 2 Accordingly, the beneficial ownership test requires disclosures
to shareholders from all participants in a tender offer that would own more
that five percent of the target company's stock upon a successful tender
offer. 5 The Interco dissent's beneficial ownership test, therefore, in requiring an investment bank that holds an option to purchase common stock

did not limit disclosure requirement to entity that makes tender offer or to party that controls
bidder).
147. See Interco, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1));
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (requiring person that, upon successful
tender offer, would be beneficial owner of more than 5% of target company's registered stock
to make disclosures to SEC).
148. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (comparing beneficial ownership test
with language of Williams Act); see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing
Interco dissenting opinion's application of beneficial ownership test).
149. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (comparing beneficial ownership test
to legislative history of Williams Act).
150. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2813 (reasoning that persons making
tender offers should not be exempt from disclosing information to SEC and target company's
shareholders); see supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's
analysis of congressional intent in enacting Williams Act).
151. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2814 (intending that any person or group
that would acquire more than 5% of target company's registered stock to make disclosures);
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (noting that Congress enacted Williams Act
to protect shareholders of target companies from persons that operated covertly in making
tender offers); see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history
of Williams Act).
152. See H.R. REp. No. 1711, at 2812-13 (discussing target company's shareholders need
for disclosures from parties that make tender offer to make informed decision); see also supra
notes 5-6 and accmpanying text (discussing legislative history of Williams Act).
153. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's
application of beneficial ownership test).
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in a shell bidding company to disclose information to shareholders of the
target companies promotes the policies behind the enactment of the Williams
Act.1
V.

Conclusion

In 1968 Congress enacted the Williams Act to ensure that shareholders
of a company that was the target of a tender offer received information
15
that enabled the shareholders to make an informed investment decision.
Recently, two federal courts have analyzed the issue of whether the Williams
Act requires an investment bank that has an equity investment in a company
making a tender offer to make disclosures to the SEC and the shareholders
of the target company. 5 6 The courts, in analyzing the investment bank's
activities, have formulated three different tests for determining whether the
investment bank must make disclosures.117 Because the securities industry
and the takeover market rely on uniformity and consistency to function
efficiently, courts need to adopt a single test." 8 The principal participant
test that the Koppers court formulated does not conform to the language
or the legislative history of the Williams Act. 5 9 Likewise, the control test
that the majority in Interco formulated does not rely on the Williams Act
but rather incorrectly relies on SEC instructions to parties that file a
disclosure statement.160 The Interco dissenting opinion's beneficial ownership
test is the only test that conforms to the language and the legislative history
of the Williams Act. 61 Because of the confusion that the SEC tender offer
regulations have caused in the courts' analyses of which parties are subject
to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, the SEC should codify
-the beneficial ownership test. 62 Accordingly, by promulgating rules that
codify the beneficial ownership test, the SEC will promote the policies that
Congress intended to promote in enacting the Williams Act and will resolve
the confusion that currently exists within the judiciary's analyses of an

154. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (comparing beneficial ownership test
with legislative history of Williams Act).
155. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Williams Act).
156. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting courts that have addressed issue
of whether Williams Act required investment banks that were equity participants in bidder to
make disclosures to SEC).
157. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text (discussing Koppers court's principal
participant test); supranotes 82-89 and accompanying text (discussing Interco majority's control
test); supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text (discussing Interco dissenting opinion's
beneficial ownership test).
158. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing need for predictibility in federal
securities laws).
159. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text (analyzing principal participant test).
160. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text (analyzing control test).
161. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (analyzing beneficial ownership test).
162. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing need for predictibility in federal
securities laws); supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (analyzing Interco dissenting
opinion's beneficial ownership test).
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investment bank's duty to disclose information in a tender offer.

63

Roger Alsup
ADDENDUM
On March 29, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals For the First
Circuit adopted the Interco dissenting opinion's reasoning that an investment
bank that stands to receive beneficial ownership of more than five percent
of a target company's stock is a bidder for disclosure purposes under the
Williams Act. MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 871 F.2d
212, 219 (1st Cir. 1989). In Prime Computer the First Circuit stated "The
more flexible, fact-based approach advocated by Judge Weis is consistent
with our reading of the Williams Act." Id. The court in Prime Computer,
therefore, determined that an investment bank that had a right to acquire
fourteen percent of the target company upon completion of the tender offer
was a bidder subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act and
the SEC tender offer regulations. Id. at 221.

163. See supra notes 15, 18-19, 162 and accompanying text (reasoning that SEC should
codify beneficial ownership test).

